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Foster: The Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Decrees

THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREES
ROBERT W. FOSTER*
I-INTRODUCTION

The term "alimony" is derived from the Latin word alere
meaning to nourish or sustain, and thus the literal meaning
is nourishment, sustenance and support.' In it origin, alimony
was the method by which the spiritual courts of England enforced the duty of support owed by a husband to his wife during such time as they were legally separated. 2 In modern jurisprudence, the term has taken on an enlarged meaning and
has come generally to include not only its former meaning,
but also the provision or allowance, whether periodical or in
gross, judically made to the wife upon an absolute divorce. 3
Alimony is not a "debt" and is not based on a contract
either expressed or implied. 4 But rather it is a social obligation to support which a court decrees in favor of a wife as a
substitute for her common-law right of marital support
founded on public policy, and is measured by the needs of the
wife and the ability of the husband to pay.5 Support due a
wife and furnished by a husband while they are living together in a natural marriage relation is not alimony, since
alimony is support due a wife when she is separated from her
husband. 6
Alimony may generally be divided into two classes: temporary alimony, which is synonymous with the terms "alimony pendente lite" and alimony "ad interim," and permanent alimony. Temporary alimony is an allowance made to the
wife for her maintenance during the pendency of a divorce
action and also for the payment of the wife's counsel fees
*B.S., U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, 1947; LL.B., University of South Carolina, 1950; LL.Z1., Duke University, 1951; Admitted to practice,
South Carolina, 1950; Admitted to practice, North Carolina, 151; Instructor of Law,
University of Louisville School of Law, 1951.

1. Speer v. Speer, 49 Ohio 65, 74 N. E. 2d 97 (1947).
2. Frank v. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Essex County

et. al., 137 N. J. L. 364, 58 Atl. 2d 601, 602 (1948).
3. See note, 18 A. L. R. 1040 (1922).

4. Smith v. Smith, D. C. N. Y. 7 F. Supp. 490 (1934).
5. Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill. 19, 31 N. E. 109 (1892) ; Robertson v. Brewer,
88 N. H. 455, 190 Atl. 709 (1937).
6. Murphy v. Murphy, 56 S. D. 355, 228 N. W. 464 (1929).
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and other expenses of the litigation. 7 Permanent alimony is
not permanent in an absolute sense, but merely as distiguished
from ad interim or temporary alimony. It continues in operation until it is terminated or modified by the court or by
3
death or remarriage of the parties.
While courts have applied the term alimony to cover an
award for support of minor children and, in some instances
to designate amounts allowed a wife in settlement of property
rights, 9 when used in this paper, the term refers to its more
specific definition-the obligation to provide for the support
of a former wife only.
Among laymen and lawyers alike, there has been a great
deal of criticism of the laws granting alimony to wives in
divorce cases and the application thereof by the courts. It
is contended by those more sympathetic with the position of
a divorced woman that the courts, in many cases, do not give
her the proper economic protection. This school of thought
may paint a truly pathetic picture of the divorcee who, having become accustomed to depending on the "stronger of the
sexes" for her support, suddenly finds herself alone in the
world faced with the grim reality of providing for herself,
and perhaps for her children.
On the other hand, it is believed by many that the law
has not kept pace with the progressively increasing independence of the female of the species and her ability to provide herself with sufficient income for her support without
the aid of the male. Thus, it has been contended, there has
been a great deal of abuse in the awarding of alimony by the
court's taking a somewhat unrealistic view of women in our
present day society.
Even those who most ardently adhere to the view that there
have been too many abuses of the husband's rights by the
courts in awarding alimony will probably concede that there
are some cases in which alimony should be granted to a divorced woman. Whatever a person's attitude toward alimony
may be, there is not likely to be any disagreement with the
view that once alimony has been properly awarded by a competent court, it should be enforced against the husband.
7. 17 AM. JUR. 407 § 497.
S. Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 408, 75 N. E. 236 (1905).
9. Nelson v. Nelson, 180 Ore. 275, 182 P. 2d 416 (1947).
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It is not the purpose of this work to enter into a discussion of the social and legal aspects of awarding alimony. The
scope of this paper is limited to the more practical consideration of the enforcement of the alimony decree after it has
been awarded, and more specifically, the enforcement of the
decree where the husband has left the jurisdiction of the
issuing state.
With the assumption that the alimony decree has been
awarded and therefore should be enforced as a legal obligation in mind, we look now at the crux of the problem of enforcement with which this paper deals. A hypothetical case
will readily reveal the difficulties to be encountered in enforcing an alimony decree rendered in a state other than the one
in which enforcement is sought. A wife successfully sues her
husband for a divorce or separation and alimony in State
A. The decree awarding the alimony may or may not be subject to modification, it may order the husband to convey land
lying either within or without the jurisdiction of the issuing
state and the decree may provide that the payments be either
in the form of a lump sum or installments. The husband then
moves to State B and the wife goes there and sues him for
enforcement of the alimony decree issued by State A. The
suit in State B by the wife may be to recover an amount
which has accrued under the foreign'0 decree at the time of
the action, it may be for the enforcement of future installments, or for both. From this factual situation, several possible barriers are encountered in an attempt to grant relief
to the wife. The general question of how and under what conditions can the payment of alimony be enforced in another
state, may be broken down into more specific ones. Must State
B give "full faith and credit" to the State A decree? Will the
result be any different if the decree is subject to modification
in State A? Will any of the difficulties be solved by reducing
the amount due to a judgment in State A? How can enforcement of future payments be facilitated in State B? What requirements must the decree meet in order to be enforceable
in State B under any condition? Will State B enforce a foreign
decree ordering a husband to convey land lying outside
of State A?
10. By "foreign" is meant here, as elsewhere in this paper, the court
of another state of the United States.
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II-ENFORCEMENT UNDER FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

The Constitution of the United States provides that each
state shall give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of every other state." The fundamental principle behind this section of the Constitution was stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Wiltiam v. State of North Carolina 12 when the court said: "The purpose of the full faith and
credit clause is to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereigns, each free to ignore obligations
created under the laws or by the judicial proceeding of the
other, and to make them integral parts of a single nation."
Thus, a judgment for a sum of money, being a debt of record,
must be given full faith and credit so that an action brought
on that judgment will be enforced in any state. 13 However,
this rule is subject to a limitation important for the purposes
of this discussion, to wit, that no action will lie in another
state on a judgment which is not final and conclusive in the
state where it is rendered. 14 This brings us to the question of
when is an alimony decree final so that it must be enforced
in a foreign jurisdiction under the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution.
In a number of divorce suits, a court will order the husband
to pay a lump sum to his wife as alimony, thus discharging
him from any future liability for support. It has been held
that a judgment for alimony in a lump sum becomes final
after adjournment of the term of court at which it is rendered,
and cannot thereafter be modified unless the court in its judgment retains the right to do so.' 5 In such a case, the judgment
being final, it will be enforced in an action brought on it in
any sister state under the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution, as it is nothing more than an or16
dinary money judgment.
11. U. S. CONST. ART. IV § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceeding of
every other State."
12. 317 U. S. 287 (1943).
13. Dunn v. Hild, 125 Pa. Super. 380, 189 Atl. 746 (1937); Paul v.
Miller, 61 Cal. App. 2d 73, 142 P. 2d 96 (1943).
14. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 535.1 (1935): Gladfelter v. Gladfelter, 205 Ark. 1019, 172 S. W. 2d 246 (1943); Kardoski v. Belanger,
52 R. L. 286, 160 Atl. 205 (1937).
15. Keach v. Keach, 217 Ky. 723, 290 S. W. 708 (1927).
16. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1392 (1935).
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The problem becomes more complex where the decree for
alimony calls for installment payments. Where there is no
power, statutory or otherwise to annul, vary, or modify the
decree, the judgment has the finality of an ordinary money
judgment and therefore it seems to be a settled rule that recovery could be had for the installments already due.'1 Thus,
in an actioh in a federal court to recover installments of alimony accrued under a decree of divorce of a California court,
the decree was held to be entitled to full faith and credit as a
fixed judgment where, although under the California Code
the court awarding alimony may from time to time modify
its order, it did not appear that the California court could
modify the decree as to alimony that had accrued. 18
The following Oregon statute is an example of the situation
in which the issuing court does not have the power to alter
accrued alimony:
At any time after a decree is given, the court or judge
thereof, upon motion of either party shall have the power
to set aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as
may provide for the appointment of trustees for the
care and custody of minor children, or the nurture and/or
education thereof, or the maintenance of either party
to the suit; provided, however, that such decree shall be
a final judgment as to any installments or payments of
money provided for therein which have accrued up to
the time either party shall move the court to set aside,
alter or modify the same; and provided further, that the
court shall not have the power to set aside, alter or
modify such decree or any portion thereof which may
provide for the payments of money, either for the nurture or education of minor children or the maintenance
17. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1067 (5th ed. 1925); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 1393 (1935); Tolley v. Tolley, 210 Ark. 144, 194 S. W. 2d

687 (1946); Appel v. Appel, 38 Ohio App. 53, 65 N. E. 2d 153 (1946).

18. Caples v. Caples, 47 F. 2d 225 (5th C. C. A. 1931); accord, Graham v. Graham, 135 Neb. 761, 284 N. W. 280 (1939); Gladfelter v.
Gladfelter, supra note 14; See Ades v. Ades, 70 Ohio App. 487, 45 N. E.
2d 416 (1943), in which the New York Court had granted a decree of
separation and had awarded alimony to the wife without any reservation of power to modify either as to prospective installments or those
that had accrued. The fact that under New York law the parties could
by agreement terminate the provision for separation and alimony and
restore the marital relation did not prevent the decree from standing
as a "final judgment" and entitled to full faith and credit in a sister
state.
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of either party to the suit, which have accrued prior to
the filing of such motion.19
There is very little difficulty in enforcing a foreign alimony
decree for the accrued installments where such installments
are reduced to a judgment in the court rendering the original
decree of alimony, even though the decree had been subject
to modification. 20 In Dadmun v. Dadmun,21 an action was
brought on a judgment of a court of New York for arrears of
unpaid alimony due under a previous New York decree of
separation ordering payments of alimony at a fixed sum per
week. In allowing recovery on the New York judgment the
court said, "Final decrees for the payment of ascertained
sums of money constituting a debt of record are entitled to
full faith and credit in every state and may be enforced by
suit in the same way as any other judgments or decrees. A
decree for the payment of a fixed sum of money found to be
already due and payable to a wife for the past support of
herself and her children is to be regarded as a final decree."22
In following this rule, the United States Supreme Court has
held that where a wife obtained a judgment for a lump sum
for all arrears of alimony installments due under an order
directing the husband to pay her a stated amount at regular
intervals, in the decree-granting state, this judgment was
final and not subject to modification and therefore entitled
23
to full faith and credit.
The real difficulty of enforcing the payment of accrued installments under a foreign alimony decree is encountered
where the decree is subject to modification by the issuing court.
It is common practice for courts to reserve, in the decree
awarding alimony, the power to vary, modify or annul it and
statutes conferring such power exist in the majority of
states. 24 An example of such a power to modify a decree is
found in the following South Carolina Statute:
19. ORE. CoMP. LAWS 1939 § 9 (915). See Mason v. Mason, 148 Or.
34, 34 P. 2d 328 (1934), "This amendment takes away the power to set

aside, alter or modify such decree or any portion thereof as regards

installments which have accrued prior to the filing of such motion."
20. See Note, 157 A. L. R. 181 (1945).
21. 279 Mass. 217, 181 N. E. 264 (1932).
22. Accord, Creaden v. Krogh, 75 Ga. App. 675, 44 S. E. 2d 136 (1948).
23. Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 (1944).
24. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 275 § 106 (1932), e.g., N.
J. STAT. ANN. § 2:50-37 (1939); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 40 § 19 (Cum. Supp.
1948).
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-Either party may apply to the court which rendered the
said judgment for an order and judgment decreasing or
increasing the amount of such alimony payments or terminating such payments, and the court, after giving both
parties an opportunity to be heard, and to introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall make such order and
judgment as justice and equity shall require, with due regard to the changed circumstances and the financial ability of the husband, decreasing or increasing or confirming the amount of alimony provided for in such original
25
judgment, or terminating such payments.
Does such a decree have the finality required for it to be
extended full faith and credit in another jurisdiction? This
question was first dealt with by the United States Supreme
Court in Barber v. Barber.27 In that case, a court of the state
of New York, having jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, granted Mrs. Barber a divorce and ordered her
husband to pay alimony in periodic installments for the support of his wife. The New York court reserved the power to
modify the alimony decree upon application of the parties.
The husband failed to pay any of the alimony and moved to
Wisconsin, where a suit was brought on the equity side of
the Federal court to recover the arrears of alimony. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the lower court granting relief to the plaintiff. In dealing
with the effect of the New York decree, the court stated:
The decree ... is a judgment of record, and will be received as such by other courts. And such a judgment or
decree, rendered in any state of the United States, the
court having jurisdiction, will be carried to judgment
in any other state, to have there the same binding force
that it has in the state in which it was originally given.
For such a purpose, both the equity courts of the United
States and the same courts of the states have jurisdiction.
• . . [The husband] places her in a situation to sue
him for a divorce a mensa et thoro, and to ask the court
having jurisdiction of her suit to allow her from her
husband's means, by way of alimony, a suitable main25. § 11, Act No. 137 of the Acts and Joint Resolutions of South Carolina, (1949).

27. 21 How. 582, 591 (U. S. 1858).
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tenance and support. When this has been done, it becomes a judicial debt of record against the husband,
which may be enforced by execution or attachment against
his person, issuing from the court which gave the decree; and when that cannot be done on account of the
husband having left or fled from that jurisdiction to another, where the process of that court cannot reach him,
the wife, by her next friend, may sue him, wherever he
may be found or where he shall have acquired a new
domicile, for the purpose of recovering the alimony due
to her, or to carry the decree into a judgment with the
same effect that it has in the state in which the decree
was given. Alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce or
separation from bed and board, is as much a debt of
record, until the decree has been recalled, as any other
judgment for money is. When it is not paid the wife can
sue her husband for it in a court of equity, as an incident
of that condition which gave to her the right to sue him,
28
by her next friend for a divorce.
Thus, at least by way of dicta, the court established the rule
that a foreign alimony decree is a debt of record and entitled
to full faith and credit, even though it is subject to recall.
Some thirty years after the Barber case, the Supreme Court
had occasion again to discuss the effects of a foreign decree
which provides for payment of alimony and which further
provides that such payment may be modified by the issuing
court in the case of Lynde v. Lynde.29 The plaintiff-wife had
obtained a decree in a New Jersey court against her husband
for back alimony due and payable, and had also obtained an
order that the husband pay to her permanent alimony in
weekly installments in the future. She sued the defendant in
a New York court seeking enforcement of the New Jersey decree. It was held that the amount which was fixed and already
due could be enforced in the foreign jurisdiction, but as the
provision for the payment of alimony in the future was subject to modification, it was not a final judgment for a fixed
sum which would be given full faith and credit. The Lynde
case, it seems, did not overrule the Barber case which established the general rule that a judgment for alimony as to past
28. [21 How. 582, 591, 595 (U. S. 1858)J.
29. 181 U. S. 183 (1901).
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installments was within the protection of the full faith and
credit clause, but merely established an exception to this general rule, to wit, that where the payment of the alimony is so
discretionary with the issuing-court that a vested right to receive it does not exist, it does not have the required finality
to entitle it to full faith and credit in a foreign state.
This interpretation was placed on the Barber and Lynde
cases by the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated
case of Sistre v. Sistare'O in an effort to clear up the confusion which had resulted from the apparent conflict in these
two cases. 81 In the Sistare case, the New York Court had
granted the wife a separation from bed and board and the
court ordered the husband to pay support money to her. A
New York statute provided as follows:
Judgment for separation may be revoked.-Upon the
joint application of the parties, accompanied with satisfactory evidence of their reconciliation a judgment for
a separation forever, or for a limited period, rendered
as prescribed in this article, may be revoked at any time
by the court which rendered it, subject to such regula32
tions and restrictions as the court thinks fit to impose.
The husband moved to Connecticut where the wife sued him
for payments which were overdue and unpaid. On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court the general rule was set out
as follows:
. . . generally speaking, where a decree is rendered for

alimony and is made. payable in future installments, the
right to such installments becomes absolute and vested
upon becoming overdue, and is therefore protected by
the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification
of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of
the installments, since, as declared in the Barber case,
'alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separation
from bed and board is as much a debt of record, until
the decree has been recalled, as any other judgment for
money is.' . . . this general rule, however, does not ob30. 218 U. S. 1 (1909).

31. Israel v. Israel, 148 F. 576 (3rd C. C. A. 1906), decided after the

Lynde case but before the Sistare case, held that the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution did not require enforcement of installments of ailmony due and payable in another state.
32. N. Y. CODE OF CIVI PROCEDURE, § 1767.
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tain where, by the law of the state in which a judgment
for future alimony is rendered, the right to demand and
receive such future alimony is discretionary with the
court which rendered the decree, to such an extent that
no absolute or vested right attaches to receive the instillments ordered by the decree to be paid, even though no
application to annul or modify the decree in respect to
alimony has been made prior to the installments becoming due.
However, it was held that the instant case does not come
within the exception set out in the Lynde case as the New
York statute did not expressly give the power to revoke or
modify the accrued installments and therefore the decree must
be recognized in Connecticut.
Thus, the Sistcre case has formulated what may be called
the "minimum" requirements to be set before a state is compelled to give full faith and credit to a foreign decree for alimony. The United States Supreme Court has consistently approved the decision of this case, 33 and it has been followed by
a large number of state courts.3 4 In a recent decision in the
District of Columbia, the court said: "Where a foreign decree
for alimony is subject to retroactive modification of accrued
installments past due, the decree is not entitled to full faith
and credit unless the accrued installments have been reduced
to a money judgment or its equivalent in the forum possessing
the right of retroactive modification." 35
Some courts, being faced with the rule on the one hand
that a judgment must be final before it need be enforced under
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution
and on the other with a desire to prevent the husband from
avoiding his legal obligation by leaving the state, have indulged the presumptions of finality of the decree, placing the
burden on the defendant to show that the power of modification does -in fact exist. In the Sistare case, the court placed a
very liberal interpretation upon the New York statute and
found that it did not subject the accrued installments to modification. To support this finding, the court, in effect, laid down
33. E.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 312 (1933); Barber
v. Barber, 323 U. S. '77 (1944).
34. E.g., Green v. Green, 239 Ala. 407, 195 So. 549 (1940); Johnson
v. Johnson, 196 Misc. 487, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 517 (1950).
35. Brown v. Brown, 75 AtI. 2d 140 (1950).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss3/4

10

Foster: The Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Decrees
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREES

the rule that in the absence of clear and express words in a
statute or alimony decree granting the power to modify, every
reasonable implication will be resorted to against such power.
In following this policy of preventing the defendant from escaping compliance with an alimony decree by leaving the jurisdiction of the issuing state, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, in enforcing a Maryland decree for alimony, said:
The finality of the Maryland decree as to the right of
the plaintiff to payments fully matured under its provisions must be presumed where there is no proof of any
Maryland law to the contrary. The obligation to give full
faith and credit to the decree sued on does not permit an
assumption that the right which it declared and secured
was subject to the unexpressed, unproved, and retroac38
tive power of revocation.
In construing a New Jersey statute relating to the right to
modify alimony and a child's support decree, the New York
court stated that every reasonable implication must be resorted
to against the existence of a power to disturb the finality of an
original decree, in the absence of clear language manifesting
a contrary intention.8 9
In regard to the rule that finality is required before full
faith and credit will be accorded a foreign judgment or order,
a new note has been interposed by the United States Supreme
Court of late, which may indicate a change in this heretofore
excepted principle of that court. Mr. Justice Jackson, specially concurring in Barber v. Barber,40 stated:
I think that the judgment of the North Carolina court
was entitled to faith and credit in Tennessee even if it
was not a final one....

Neither the full faith and credit

clause of the Constitution, nor the Acts of Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments. Both
require that full faith and credit be given to "judicial
proceedings" without limitation as to finality.
In Griffin v. Griffin,4' before the Supreme Court in 1946, as
the majority of the court found that the action was brought
on an ex parte judgment in violation of due process, the
38.
39.
40.
41.

Alexander v. Alexander, 164 S. C. 466, 162 S. E. 437 (1932).
Smith v. Smith, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 188, 255 App. Div. 652 (1939).
Supra, note 23, p. 87.
327 U. S.220 (1946).
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court left open the question of whether there could be recovery
on the original decree. In a dissenting opinion, however, Mr.
Justice Rutledge found that there was not a denial of due
process, and, therefore, faced with a further consideration of
the application of the full faith and credit clause, he stated:
The full faith and credit clause does not in any case require that a judgment to be credited, must be endowed
by the law of its origin with finality sufficient to sustain the issuance and levy of execution, although the
same law may afford an opportunity for setting aside or
modifying it upon the making of a specified showing.
This is true, in my opinion, whether the suit is on the
42
1938 judgment, or on the original decree.
These expressions of opinion by several members of the
United States Supreme Court have led to the suggestion that
it would not be surprising to see this court take the view in
the future that a lack of finality will not warrant a denial
43
of full faith and credit to a foreign alimony decree.
A decree for temporary alimony or alimony pendente lite
is oftentimes awarded to the wife during the pendency of a
divorce action.43a This is generally not a final decree either
as to installments which are to accrue in the future or as to
installments that have already accrued, and it is within the
discretionary power of the court, pending the suit, to change
its order as to both future and past-due alimony payable
thereunder."4 Hence, it has been generally held that a decree
for temporary alimony is not entitled to recognition in another state even as to installments which have already accrued prior to the application at the forum to enforce payment.45 In criticizing this refusal by the courts to enforce a
foreign decree for alimony pendente lite, Professor Jacobs
states:
... it would seem that the courts are being overly technical; that they are unduly influenced by the law concern42. Joined by Mr. Justice Black. See also a separate dissent by Mr.

Justice Frankfurter.
43. Note, 24 TEx. L. REV. 491 (1946).
43a. Act No. 137 of the ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1949, § 8, allows the wife to receive alimony pendente lite.
44. Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382 (1927); Colby v. Colby,
200 La. 321, 7 So. 2d 924 (1942).
45. See note, 157 A. L. R. 185 (1945); 2 BFALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
1393 (1935); Kelly v. Kelly, 121 N. J. Eq. 361, 189 Atl. 665 (1937).
But see, Paul v. Paul, 121 Kan. 88, 90, 245, P. 1022, 1023 (1926).
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ing the extraterritorial enforcement of money judgments
in general; that they have failed to consider the social
problems involved in the award of temporary alimony.
Here, even more than in the case of permanent alimony,
is the award based upon the necessities of the wife. If
the husband is able to escape his obligations by going to
another jurisdiction, something is the matter with the law
46
in this field.
III-ENFORCEMENT ON GROUNDS OF

COMITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
It has been thus far seen that under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution and the cases
decided thereunder, that in order for a judgment of one state
to be enforced in another state, such judgment must be
final. Under this limitation, no foreign decree for the payment
of alimony which is subject to modification could be enforced
in another jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would be impossible
for a wife to maintain an action for future installments of
alimony in any state other than the one granting the decree.
She could not invoke the aid of equity to enforce a foreign
alimony decree, as by contempt proceedings for disobedience
to the terms of its mandate or any other equitable remedies
prescribed under local statutes in a jurisdiction which treats
a decree for ailmony as a mere money judgment. The general
rule is to the effect that equity has jurisdiction over civil cases
only where there is not a full, adejuate and complete remedy
at law. 47 If the alimony due under a decree of a foreign court
is treated as a debt, collectable by execution upon a judgment
recovered locally upon the foreign decree, the remedy at law
is adequate, and equity has no jurisdiction. This was the accepted view in all of the earlier cases where attempts were
made to acquire equitable enforcement of foreign alimony decrees, 48 and many courts have continued to adhere to these
49
cases and have refused to grant equitable relief.
46. JACOBS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREES, 6 LAw
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 250, 260 (1939).
47. 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 132

(5th ed. 1941).
48. E.g., Wood v. Wood, 7 Misc. 579, 28 N. Y. S. 154 (1894); Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq. 306, 49 AtI. 501 (1901); Mayer v. Mayer,

154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 890 (1908).

49. Worsley v. Worsley, 64 App. D. C. 202, 76 F. 2d 815 (1935);
Grant v. Grant, 64 App. D. C. 146, 75 F. 2d 665 (1935); Seltmann v.
Seltmoann, 322 Mass. 650, 79 N. E. 2d 11 (1948).
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Equitable means of enforcement of foreign alimony decrees
are denied in some jurisdictions on the grounds that equitable
remedies prescribed under local statutes for the enforcement
of decrees for alimony have reference only to decrees of local
courts, and not to decrees of the courts of other states.5 0 Other
courts deny equitable relief on the ground that the state is
not bound by the full faith and credit provision to grant such
relief in the enforcement of foreign decrees for alimony, because that provision has no reference to the method of or
remedy for enforcement of the foreign judgment. 51
Due to the strong public policy involved, many courts have
not been content with such an unconscionable result and have
gone much further than the bare requirements of the full
faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution in order
to make the wife's claim enforceable. Full faith and credit
applies to judgments which must be recognized in another
state, but even though a judgment rendered by another state
is such as not to fall with the protection of this clause, recognition may be accorded such a judgment under the doctrine of
comity.5 2
Minnesota was the first state to go beyond the general rule
set out in the Sistare case in respects to the requirements of
finality in order to accord full faith and credit to a foreign
decree for alimony. In a 1922 case in that state, an action
was brought to recover accrued installments of alimony under
an Oregon decree, and the defendant contended that the decree
was not a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit in
Minnesota as an Oregon statute provides that a decree is subject to modification at any time after its rendition. The court,
in allowing the enforcement said:
so long as a judgment for alimony is absolute in its
terms and remains unmodified, or at least until an application for modification has been made, it is final as to
installments of alimony which have accrued. Sound public policy forbids the adoption of a rule which would permit a husband to escape his obligation to support his
wife or infant children by crossing a state line. It has
...

50. E.g., Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N. E. 206 (1931);
Page v. Page, 189 lass. 85, 75 N. E. 92 (1905); Mayer v. Mayer, 154
Mfich. 386, 117 N. W. 890 (1908).

51. E.g., Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676 (1894).
52. 31 AM. Jun. 134 § 531.
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been well said that the courts should follow a course
which will tend to unify the remedial agencies of the
country by making them enforceable in all its parts. It

would be a reproach to our system of legal administration
if one could escape from the operation of a judicial decree by going into another state, for this is one country
53
and so far as possible it should have one law.

While the court in this case stated that it was following
the Sistare case, it seems that the limitation established by the
Lynde case was disregarded. This case seems to extend the
limitation that foreign alimony decrees need not be accorded
full faith and credit where they are subject to modification by
the issuing state, to the rule that full faith and credit applies
where the accrued installments have not been actually modified
and no application for modification appears to have been made
prior to the action, even though these' installments were subject to modification. Although this case may be open to criticism as an application of the general rules governing the conditions under which full faith and credit will be accorded a
judgment of another state, it may be justified on the basis
of comity.5 4

Led by California, some states have gone even further than
this and have established the foreign decree as a domestic
judgment, thus allowing a recovery of accrued installments,
even though such installments are subject to modification. 56
This treatment of a foreign alimony decree will be dealt with
in more detail in the following discussion on equitable enforcement.

As has been previously pointed out, the right to equitable
means of enforcing a foreign alimony decree as by sequestration or contempt, in many cases the only method whereby the
wife could obtain relief, was denied by the courts in the earlier
decisions. There was nothing to require the courts to grant
equitable relief in the enforcement of foreign alimony decrees. But here, as in the case of accrued alimony which was
subject to modification, some states have applied the principle
53. Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 351, 190 N. W. 542, 544 (1922).

54. JAcoBs, THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DECREE FOR ALImONY, 6
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 250, 264 (1939).

55. Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App. 2d 357, 55 P. 2d 228 (1936); Straus

v. Straus, 4 Cal. App. 2d 461, 41 P. 2d 218 (1935); Cummings v. Cum-

mings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 P. 245 (1929).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1952

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1952], Art. 4

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

of comity to prevent the husband from evading his legal obligation to support his wife by crossing a state line.
After the Lynde case, which had denied a New York woman
the statutory remedies for the enforcement of a New Jersey
alimony decree, New York amended its civil code to remedy
this situation. 56 Section 117157 provides that where an alimony order of another state is awarded in a suit for divorce
on grounds available for divorce in New York, and the action
has been brought to judgment in New York, the equitable
remedy of sequestration is available to the plaintiff for enforcement of the decree. Section 117258 provides for the enforcement of foreign alimony decrees by contempt proceedings when the same requirement set out in Section 1171 are
met. While Section 1172 does not expressly limit the situation
to cases where a divorce was obtained on grounds of adultery,
it has been held that this Section must be read with Section
1171 which placed this limitation on the applicability of these
Sections. 59 Thus, the limitation of enforcement of foreign decrees to those based upon adultery, qualifies the application
of Section 1172, as well as Section 1171.60
It was not until 1927 that a state court threw off the chains
of restrictions placed on the enforcement of foreign alimony
decrees by all of the earlier cases in this country which had
adhered to the strict analysis of Sistare v. Sistare. This step
was taken by the Mississippi Court in the celebrated case of
Franchierv. Gammill.6' Here, a suit was brought seeking to
establish and enforce a decree for alimony rendered by a Nevada court. As the plaintiff asked the court to direct payment
of installments in the future, it was only maintainable in
equity, and the relief at law could be given only for what was
due. The defendant contended that as a decree for alimony is
a mere debt collectable by execution upon a judgment recovered locally upon the foreign decree, and the remedy at law
for its enforcement being complete and adequate, equity has
56. JACOBS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DECREES FOR ALIMONY, 6

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 250, 270 (1939).
57. CIV. PRAC. ACT, § 1171.
58. NEW YORK Civ. PRAC. ACT, § 1172.
59. Moen v. Thompson, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (1946).
60. See NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. (1939) § 2:50-37, which permits the
wife to bring a separate action for alimony based upon a local or foreign decree for divorce. Thus, the New Jersey court may enter a domestic
decree for alimony based upon a foreign divorce. Discussed in Levy

v. Levy, 17 N. J. Misc. 324, 9 Atl. 2d 779 (1939).
61. 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927).
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no jurisdiction to undertake its enforcement. 2 The court, however, refused to be restricted to the general rule for the enforcement of money judgments. The social interest involved
in this case led to a refusal by the court to sit back and allow
the defendant to avoid making the alimony payments. In so
holding for the plaintiff, the court said:
It is our view that, on account of the character of a judgment for alimony which rests, to some extent, upon public policy, in requiring a husband to support his wife
and children, due to the sacred human relationship, and
that they may not become public charges and derelicts,
the decree for alimony, with the extraordinary power of
enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings,
should be established and enforced by our equity court,
which has full and sole jurisdiction of all matters of divorce and alimony; because to hold that a foreign judgment for alimony can be enforced in this state only by
execution, the same as judgments at law, would be to impair or to deprive a foreign judgment for alimony of its
inherent power to enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings. Thus, as we view it, to so hold would
be to disregard the "full faith and credit" clause of the
federal law, which we interpret to mean that the judgment, with its peculiar right of enforcement, as one for
alimony, should be established and enforced by the equity
courts of our state in the same manner, and to the same
extent, as it could have been enforced by our court if
originally obtained in our state.
Thus, the Mississippi court in the Fancher case, recognized
the practical difficulties attendant upon the necessity of repeated suits in cases of installment payments and the ease
with which a law enforcement can be evaded, as creating a
need for equitable enforcement.
Two years later, an action was brought in an equity court
in California on a New York alimony decree in which the
plaintiff asked for back payments then due and for an order
for future payments against the defendant who owned property in California. The defendant contended that the court is
62. This contention is supported by abundant authorities in many

jurisdictions. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 29 App. D. C. 258 (1907); Page v.
Page, 189 Mass. 85, 75 N. E. 92 (1905).
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not bound to enforce future payments of alimony under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and, therefore,
the court should not so enforce the New York decree. The court
cited Fanchier v. Gammill with approval, and held in effect
that the New York decree is established as a decree of the
California court and shall be enforced as such so long as it
remains unmodified by the courts of New York.6 3 The California courts have continually ordered that foreign decrees
providing for future payments of alimony be established as
a California court's decree, with the same force and effect as
64
if entered in California.
Minnesota was the next state to allow equitable enforcement of an alimony decree of another state by treating the decree as though it had been rendered by a Minnesota court.
In Ostranderv. Ostrander,65 the court said:
Transplantation of the parties from one state to another
has not reduced the obligation to the ordinary category
of "a debt of record." Migration of the parties across a
state line has wrought no change in the nature and basis
of alimony needed for the support of a foreign wife and
the child of herself and her debtor. To the ordinary mind,
untroubled by legal nuances, the money due from defendant remains alimony wherever they or either may be. We
prefer that nontechnical view which regards the substance of the matter as unchanged by mere removal of
the debtor across a state line.
In the year following the decision of the Ostrandercase, an
action was commenced in the Washington court praying that
an alimony decree rendered in California be enforced by that
court in equity by contempt proceedings against the husband,
if necessary. The court granted the equitable enforcement to
the California decree quoting with approval, excerpts from
66
the Fanchiercase.
In 1936, the Connecticut court allowed the application of
equitable remedies in the enforcement of a New York alimony
decree so far as the amount of installments which were in
63. Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 P. 245 (1929).

64. Creager v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P. 2d 552

(1932); Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal. 2d 48, 59 P. 2d 953 (1936); Gough
v. Gough, 225 P. 2d 668 (1951).
65. 190 Minn. 547, 551, 252 N. W. 449, 450 (1934).
66. Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P. 2d 446 (1935).
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arrears at the time of the action. However, the court refused
to enforce the payment of future installments on the ground
that the foreign decree was subject to modification in the state
67
of its rendition.
In the same year, the Oregon court reviewed the authorities
on both sides of this question, and adhered to the rule adopted
by the California, Mississippi and Washington courts, to the
effect that a foreign decree for alimony may be enforced by the
same equitable remedies as are available for its 68enforcement
in the courts of the state where it was rendered.
In Johnson v. Johnson,69 the plaintiff brought an action on
a Florida alimony decree praying for judgment for the amount
of accrued unpaid alimony, for all future monthly installments
as they become due in accordance with the provisions of the
foreign decree, and further, that the decree of the Florida court
for alimony be established in this state as a foreign judgment
to be enforced by appropriate equitable remedies as is usual
in such cases. Citing the Washington, Mississippi, and Minnesota cases as authority for its view, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded, ".

.

. that a decree for alimony granted

by a foreign court may be established and enforced by and
through the equity courts of this state, and that our equity
courts may assume jurisdiction thereof."
An action was brought in Kentucky in which the plaintiff
sought equitable enforcement by contempt proceedings of an
Illinois judgment for accrued payments for support, and also
for future payments as provided for under the decree. The
court allowed the equitable enforcement as to the accrued
payments, but refused to allow the equitable remedy to extend to future installments on the ground that the latter was
subject to modification. 70
In 1942, the Illinois court joined the line of decisions which
adhere to the rule that an alimony decree in one state may be
67. German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 Atl. 429 (1936).

68. Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P. 2d 897 (1936).
69. 194 S.C. 115, 8 S.E. 2d 351 (1940).
70. Glanton v. Renner, 285 Ky. 808, 149 S. W. 2d 748 (1941). See,
Espleland v. Espleland, 111 Mont. 365, 109 P. 2d 792 (1941), where the
point was not directly decided, but the court intimated that though a
foreign decree for the payment of future alimony is not within the full
faith and credit provision, it may be enforced in Montana under the
principle of comity. See also, Sorenson v. Spence, 65 S.D. 134, 272 N. W.
179 (1937), where the South Dakota court enforced a decree for the support of children even though it was not required to under the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution.
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established as a foreign decree and enforced in their local
courts, and thus allowed enforcement for future payments
as well as arrears on a Nevada alimony decree.71 Two years
later, the Florida court, after citing the authorities on both
sides of this problem, elected to follow the doctrine of Fanchier
v. Gammill and allowed the equitable enforcement of a Georgia
2
alimony decree.
Virginia was the next state to hold in accord with the above
outlined cases. In an action brought on an alimony decree
issued by the Florida court praying for judgment against the
defendant for both accrued and future installments of alimony and support money in accordance with the provisions of
the Florida decree, the Virginia court ordered equitable enforcement of the decree. After citing a number of the cases
which support this view, the court said:
We agree with the reasoning in these latter cases, which
in our opinion, is sound and in line with the public policy
of this state. It is elementary that a husband's duty to
support his wife and children is not merely contractual,
but is one in which the public has a vital interest. The obligation, wherever incurred, is the same and cannot be
avoided or lessened by the simple device of crossing a
state line. Since the appellant has become a resident of
Virginia, the public policy of this state now demands
that his obligation be performed as fully as if it had been
incurred here in the first instance.7
The latest state to allow equitable enforcement of a foreign
alimony decree is Tennessee. The plaintiff was granted an
alimony decree in Georgia and prays to have this decree enforced in Tennessee, where the husband is now a resident, by
contempt proceedings. In allowing the equitable enforcement
of the decree, the Supreme Court of Tennessee said:
We are of the opinion that it is not consistent with sound
public policy and justice to refuse to enforce in this state
alimony judgments of a sister state by the equitable
remedy of sequestration or attachment for contempt, etc.,
to the same extent as we enforce such judgments when
71. Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N. E. 2d 379 (1942).

72. McDuffie v. McDuffie, 155 Fla. 63, 19 So. 2d 511 (1944), followed
in Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (Fla.) (1950).
73. MecKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 115, 37 S. E. 2d 746, 750 (1946).
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originally rendered in our courts; provided, of course,
this foreign judgment is enforceable by these equitable
remedies in the state which originally rendered such
judgment.
The trend of the later cases on the enforceability of foreign
alimony decrees is reflected by this statement appearing in an
annotation on this subject :4
There is an increasingly respectful authority for the
view that though a foreign decree of alimony is not under
the full faith and credit provision entitled to recognition
and enforcement extra-territorially, as respects installments not accrued at the time, it may be so enforced under
the rules of comity by establishing the foreign decree as a
local decree and clothing it with all the equitable remedies
by which the enforcement of a local decree of alimony may
be secured.
IV-REQUIREMENTS PREREQUISITE TO ENFORCEMENT
We have seen that under the doctrine of the Sistare case,
full faith and credit must be accorded foreign alimony decrees
when the decree is not subject to modification and is therefore final. Does this rule apply to a foreign alimony decree
which is final but against the public policy of the forum? A
further question which arises is, how far will a state court,
which enforces a foreign alimony decree which is not final on
the grounds of comity, go in enforcing a decree which is contrary to the laws of the forum? Most of the states which enforce foreign alimony decrees subject to modification, do so by
treating the decree as a domestic judgment as though it was
originally rendered in the forum. Will these courts enforce a
decree of another state where the grounds for issuing the decree are not grounds for such a decree in the forum?
It seems to be well settled that a valid judgment in another
state can not be denied enforcement under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution on the grounds
that it would have been contrary to the public policy of the
forum to allow action on the original claim. 75 Under this generally accepted interpretation of the full faith and credit
74. Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 203 S. W. 2d 597, 599 (1947).

75. Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 117, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941).
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clause of the United States Constitution, it seems that once
the amount of due alimony installments have been reduced to
a valid judgment, this judgment must be recognized and enforced in any state in which it is brought, public policy of
such enforcing state to the contrary notwithstanding. It also
seems apparent from this general proposition that full faith
and credit must be accorded a foreign decree with regard to
accrued installments of alimony not subject to modification,
even though the original decree is based on law repugnant to
the public policy and laws of the state where enforcement of
the decree is sought.76 In a North Carolina case, it appeared
that the plaintiff was awarded a complete divorce and alimony in a Florida court, and brought this action in the North
Carolina court to have this decree made a judgment of that
court as if said judgment was originally rendered by the
courts of North Carolina. The court found that the alimony
decree was not subject to modification as to past due installments by the Florida court and was therefore final and entitled to full faith and credit. The defendant contended that
the Florida alimony decree should not be enforced in North
Carolina, as such decree was granted in violation of the laws
of North Carolina, in that no allowance for future support
may be awarded where a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is
granted in that state. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
concluded that there is no principle of law upon which full
faith and credit can be denied the Florida judgment, even
though such a decree could not have been rendered under the
77
laws of North Carolina.
A somewhat different situation is involved, however, in the
cases where an alimony decree is subject to modification and
therefore not required to be given full faith and credit in another state, but is enforced in the state on the grounds of
comity. Such a rule of comity is subject to the principle that
foreign laws will not be given effect when contrary to the
settled public policy of the forum. 8 There has been a great
deal of difficulty and uncertainty when judicial attempt is
made to determine the meaning of the term "public policy, '79
76. Lockman v. Lockman, 220 N. C. 95, 16 S. E. 2d 670 (1941).
77. 15 C. J. S. 853, § 4; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U. S. 487 (1940).
78. McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Or. 422, 285 P. 208, 213, "The phrase 'public policy' is a term which seems difficult of precise definition."
79. International Harvester Co. v. McAdams, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W.
1042 (1910).
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but a mere variance between the law of the forum and the
law of the state where the cause arose does not alone warrant
such denial of enforcement. 80 As set forth in the restatement:
"There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of
duties validly created by the law governing their creation.
Denial of enforcement of a foreign claim will result in an undeserved benefit to the defendant." 8' It has generally been held
that to justify a court in refusing to enforce foreign laws because it would be against public policy, "it must appear that
it would be against good morals or natural justice, or for some
other reason would be prejudicial to the state or its citizens. '8 2
This question of the effects of public policy on the enforcement of foreign alimony decrees by comity, arose in California. As has been observed previously, the courts of California will grant enforcement of a foreign decree for future
payments by treating the decree as though it has been entered
in California. In the instant case, the defendant claims that
a Missouri decree for future alimony was not enforceable
under the full faith and credit clause and rules of comity
should not extend to the enforcement of this decree as the
plaintiff has remarried and the law of California provides
that a divorced wife who remarries, is no longer entitled to
alimony. The court held that while the Missouri law differs
from that of California in permitting alimony payments to
continue after the remarriage of the divorced wife, such a
right is not perforce inharmonious with local public policy
and therefore not sufficient to prevent the court from enforcing the decree on grounds of comity. Quoting from the opinion of the court: "It offers no threat to either the moral standards or the general interests of the citizens of this state. To
80. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 617, comment c. (1934).
81. Keane Wonder Mining Co. v. Cunningham, 222 F. 821 (9th C. C.
A. 1915); Rubin v. Schupp, 127 F. 2d 625 (9th C. C. A. 1942); Personal
Finance Co. of New York v. General Finance Co., 133 Pa. Super. 582,
3 Atl. 2d 174 (1938).
82. Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 117, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941). Accord, Harper v. Carpenter, 24 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 751, 67 P. 2d 762
(1937), where recovery of alimony installments was allowed based on
a Nevada decree granting husband the divorce, even though the law
of the forum provided by statute that no alimony will be awarded to
a wife where the husband obtained the divorce. Followed in Morrow v.
Morrow, 40 Cal. App. 2d 474, 105 P. 2d 129 (1940), where the California
court allowed enforcement of a Nevada alimony decree based on a divorce procured by the husband, the court saying: ".... there is no inconsistency in the rules of the two states that the morals of the citizens
of California would suffer detriment, neither can the Nevada rule be

said to be against the public policy of this state."
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hold that the right created in Missouri is so immoral as to
be unenforceable here, would involve 8a3 complacent attribution of moral superiority to this state.
In order to invoke the United States Constitutional provision of granting full faith and credit to judicial proceedings,
it has been consistently held that the foreign judgment or decree be a valid, personal and final adjudication, remairing in
full force and virtue in the jurisdiction of its rendition, and
capable of being enforced there.84 The requirement of finality
has already been treated in another part of this paper, so we
now come to the problem of when the decree is "valid" so as
to bring it within the protection of the full faith and credit
clause.
It has been generally held that where there is an irregularity in the rendition of the judgment or decree, such as an ir86
5
regular form in the proceeding, or a mistake as to the law,
this would not be sufficient to deny the application of full faith
87

and credit.

A judgment or order of a state is not considered valid and
entitled to full faith and credit in another state where there
is a want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment
or order.8 8 Since a decree for alimony is in its effect a mere
decree for the payment of money, it is clearly a decree in personam, and not in rem, and in order to support it, there must
therefore be personal jurisdiction over the defendant or jurisdiction over his property. If, as often happens, the defendant
in a divorce case is served only by publication, being a nonresident, it is not possible to render a valid decree against him
for alimony.89 Thus, it has been held that full faith and credit
does not require recognition of a judgment if the party against
whom the judgment is urged was not a party or privy or
appeared in the judgment suit.90 This limitation on the application of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
83. 50 C. J. S. 443, § 868; e.g., Gobin v. Citizens State Bank of

Cheney, Kan., 92 Colo. 350, 20 P. 2d 1007 (1933).
84. E.g., Re Osborne, 205 N. C. 716, 172 S. E. 491 (1934).
85. E.g., Marin v. Augedahl, 24 U. S. 142 (1917).
86. 31 AM. JUR., 150 § 540.
87. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 209 (3rd ed. 1949).
88. 2 BEALE, THE

CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1935); RESTATEMENT, JUDG-

§ 116 (1942); 17 AI. Jun., DIVORCE § 764; Downs v. Downs
Adm'r., 123 Ky. 405, 96 S. W. 536 (1906).
89. Wilson v. Smart, 324 Iii. 276, 155 N. E. 288 (1927); Hutton v.
Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 P. 165 (1921).
90. Botz v. Helvering, 134 F. 2d 538 (C. C. A. 8th 1943).
UENTS
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365

has been stated by the United States Supreme Court as follows: "The requirement of full faith and credit is to be read
and interpreted in the light of well-established principles of
justice, protected by other constitutional provisions which it
was never intended to modify or override, such as due process. 91
These general principles were applied by the United States
Supreme Court in Griffin v. Griffi, 92 The wife had obtained
a divorce in New York and an original award of $3,000 annual alimony, in 1926. In 1936, she obtained a judgment for
arrears then due in a suit in New York in which the husband
appeared and defended. Then, in 1938, she obtained another
judgment awarding her the amount accrued between 1936
and 1938. This latter judgment was awarded without further
notice or opportunity to be heard given to the defendant. Since
the husband had moved to the District of Columbia, she then
brought suit in the court there on the New York judgment,
and recovered a judgment for the full amount, in spite of his
defense of lack of due process in the latest New York judgment. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
that the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to raise
defenses in the latter New York judgment, depriving him of
judicial due process, and thus the New York court had no
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, a prerequisite
to the rendition of a judgment in personam against him. The
judgment having been obtained in violation of procedural due
process, is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon
93
in another jurisdiction.
Appearance by the defendant gives the court power to render a valid personal judgment against him. 94 If the defendant

is domiciled in the state, the alimony order would be valid,
even though the defendant was not served personally within
the state. 95
91. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225

U. S.111, 134 (1914).
92. Supra, note 41.
93. Citing, National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S.257 (1904);
Baker v. Baker Eccles & Co., 242 U. S.394 (1916); c.f. Defoe v. Defoe,
116 W. Va. 197, 179 S.E. 74 (1935) ; see, Adams v. Saenger, 303 U. S.
59 (1937), where the court held that if the judgment appeared on its
face to be a "record of a court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction
over the cause and the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by
extrinsic evidence, or by the record itself." Accord, Ades v. Ades, 70 Ohio
App. 487, 45 N. E. 2d 416 (1942).
94. Austin v. Austin, 173 Mich. 47, 138 N. W. 237 (1912).
95. Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 161 N. W. 148 (1917).
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While the full faith and credit provision of the Constitution does not require enforcement of an alimony decree rendered in another state without proper jurisdiction of the defendant, could such a decree be enforced on grounds of comity?
While there is little authority on this point, it seems apparent
that such an enforcement would be a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, which, it has been pointed out,
must be read in connection with the full faith and credit
clause. 96 This is the view taken by the Restatement, 97 and in
Griffin v. Griffin,98 it was stated by way of dictum: "Moreover, due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall
give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process."
A valid alimony decree entitled to full faith and credit may
be ordered against a defendant even though the court issuing
the decree has no personal jurisdiction over him, where the
defendant has property in the state. 9 Where the nature and
situs of the property are such as to support a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, the rule is that constructive service of
process or personal service outside the state, even in the case
of a non-resident, will give jurisdiction to render a decree
for alimony, binding upon property belonging to him which
is within the jurisdiction of the court and has been specifically
proceeded against. 100 In such a case, the proceedings are directed against the property of the defendant and a claim on
the property is made, out of which the court might then order
a payment of alimony.'1 1 This jurisdiction extends only to the
ascertainment of the obligation and the subjection of the property seized thereto, and not to the rendition of any personal
10 2
judgment against the defendant.

96. Bigelow v. Old Dominion, supra, note 91.
97. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 11, comment c. (1942).
98. Supra, note 41.
99. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 462.1 (1935).

100. Wilson v. Smart, supra, note 89; Zuhlke v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 279 N. Y. S. 833, 244 App. Div. 549 (1935).
101. Forrester v. Forrester, 155 Ga. 722, 118 S. E. 373 (1923).
102. 21 C. J. S. 125 § 83; Stevens v. Cecil, 214 N. C. 217, 199 S. E.
161 (1939); Guaranty Trust of New York v. Bell, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 137,

182 Misc. 372 (1943).
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V-ENFORCEMENT WHERE ORIGINAL DECREE ORDERS THE
CONVEYANCE OF LAND LYING OUTSIDE THE
DECREEING STATE

Quite frequently, in granting a divorce and alimony decree, the court will order the husband to convey land to his
wife as a means of providing for her support. The rule seems
to be well established that equity has the power to compel the
conveyance whenever the husband or the land ordered to be
conveyed is within the jurisdiction of the court. 10 3 As to land
situated within the state, the legislature may confer on courts
of equity, a jurisdiction which shall operate on such land in
some way other than by merely directing a party to do some
act concerning the property. This power has been very generally exercised. 04 Thus, the land could be conveyed to the
wife, as for example by the sheriff, even though the defendant may not have been personally served with process within
the state. 10 5
If the land ordered to be conveyed lies outside the state
issuing the order but the court has jurisdiction over the defendant-owner of the land, conveyance may be compelled by
equitable enforcement in the state having such personal jurisdiction over the defendant.0 8 The principle on which this
jurisdiction rests is that the equity court, acting in personam
parties bound
and not in rem, holds the conscience of the
07
property.
the
of
situs
the
to
regard
without
The problem becomes much more difficult where the land
which the decree orders to be conveyed to the wife, is located
in another state and the husband has left the jurisdiction of
the issuing state before he can be compelled to execute the
conveyance. In such a case, could the wife maintain an action in the equity court of the state where the land is located,
103. 19 AM. Jur. 52, § 24.

104. E.g., Ford v. Judsonia Mercantile Co., 52 Ark. 426, 12 S. W. 876

(1890); Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 20; 25 Am. REP. 416 (1899).
105. Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289,

88 P. 356 (1906).

106. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1384 (5th ed. 1925); 19 Am. JuR. 73,
§ 81; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 77 (3rd ed. 1949); Peoples Loan
Co. v. Allen, 199 Ga. 537, 34 S. E. 2d 811 (1945) ; Zentzis v. Zentzis, 163
Wis. 342, 158 N. W. 284 (1916) ; Bailey v. Tully, 242 Wis. 226, 7 N. W.

2d 837 (1943); White v. Warren, 214 Mass. 304, 100 N. E. 1103 (1913):
"But while the Legislature of Rhode Island has no power to regulate
dower in land located in this commonwealth, its courts do have power
to proceed in personam, notwithstanding that the decree incidentally
affects land in another jurisdiction."
107. Smith v. Fletcher, 102 Wash. 218, 173 P. 19 (1918).
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based on the original order to convey, to require the husband
to convey the land to her?
The early principle that courts of one state could not directly affect the legal title to land situated in another state, 108
is well illustrated by the following excerpt:
It is a fundamental maxim of jurisprudence that every
state or nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its own territory. A consequence of
this maxim is that no state can by its laws, and no court,
which is but a creature of the state, can by its judgments
or decrees, directly bind or affect property beyond the
limits of that state.... Any attempt by one state to give
to its courts jurisdiction beyond its own limits over persons domiciled or property situated in another state is
a usurpation of authority, and all judicial proceedings in
virtue therof are held utterly void.10 9
Another difficulty in attempting to enforce a decree ordering the conveyance of land lying in another state, is the traditional belief that a foreign decree in equity ordering the
doing of an act, cannot form the subject of an action for specific performance in the court of equity of another state. 110
This question was squarely before the New Jersey Supreme
Court in the case of Bullock v. Bullock."' Mrs. Bullock was
granted a divorce and awarded alimony by the New York
court in an action in which her husband was personally served
and appeared. It was further ordered that Mr. Bullock execute
and deliver to her a mortgage of certain land located in New
Jersey, which he owned, as security for payment of the alimony. Mr. Bullock left New York without executing the
mortgage and an action was brought against him in New
Jersey, praying for an order that he execute the mortgage
as ordered in the New York decree. By a divided court, 112 it
108. See note, 51 A. L. R. 108 (1927).
109. 7 R. C. L. 1058.
110. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 449.1 (1935) in which Beale
attributes this principle to the fact "that there is no action known to
the common law for the enforcement of a foreign judgment except the
action for debt upon the judgment; and debt will lie only for a certain
sum of money due."
111. 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676 (1894).
112. Six judges supported the majority view and six others voted for
a dissenting opinion which took the position that the New York decree,
although it did not of its own force create a lien upon the New Jersey
lands, was conclusive of the plaintiff's rights to have the defendant
execute a mortgage upon New Jersey lands. The deciding vote was a
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was held that the action must be dismissed, as the decree ordering the defendant to convey, creates only a duty to the
court pronouncing it, and, furthermore, to enforce such a decree would be to allow one state to create rights in land of
another. It was pointed out in the majority opinion: "That
the doctrine that jurisdiction respecting lands in a foreign
state is not in rem, but one in personam, is bereft of all practical force, if the decree in personam is conclusive and must
be enforced by the courts of the situs," and that such a doctrine would result in practically depriving a state of that exclusive control over its real estate which has already been
accorded. 113
In Fall v. Eastin,"1 4 a commissioner executed a deed to

land in Nebraska under a decree of a court of the state of
Washington in an action for divorce in which there was jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. The plaintiff
invoked the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
of the United States to sustain the deed. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that there was no violation of full
faith and credit as this clause of the Constitution does not
extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one state to property
situated in another. Quoting with approval from Watkins v.
Holman et al,"5 the court said:
No principle is better established than that the disposition of real estate, whether by deed, descent, or by any
other modes, must be governed by the laws of the state
where the land is situated ....

A court of chancery, act-

ing in personam, may well decree the conveyance of land
in any other state, and may well enforce its decree by
process against the defendant. But neither the decree itconcurring opinion which was based on the position that the order to
execute a mortgage on New Jersey land was not a part of the New York
judgment upon the issue before the court, but was a mere decretal order
ancillary to execution.
113. Williams v. Williams, 83 Or. 59, 60, 162 P. 834, 835 (1917): "The
decree of the superior court of Napa County, California, was void so far
as it attempted to adjudicate the title to lands in Oregon ....
No judgment of a court of another jurisdiction can have any effect per se upon
the title to land. The only way in which the conveyance of the land beyond the jurisdiction of the court can be effected is by a decree in equity
operating upon the person so as to coerce the party. The decree itself
can have no direct operation upon the property."
114. 215 U. S. 1 (1909). This case went to the Supreme Court as an
appeal from a decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Fall v. Fall,
75 Neb. 104, 106 N. W. 412 (1905).
115. 16 Pet. 25 U. S. 57 (1842).
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self nor any conveyance under it, except by the person in
whom the title is vested, can operate beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
however plausibly the conThus, the court concluded: "...
trary view may be sustained, we think that the doctrine that
the court, not having jurisdiction of the res, cannot affect it
by its decree, nor by a deed made by a6 master in accordance
with the decree, is firmly established.""1
Beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, we find
a few scattered cases which began to get away from the orthodox view that equitable decrees ordering something other
than the payment of money-for example, the conveyance of
foreign land-will not be enforced in another state. While
these early cases did not involve alimony decrees, the same
principle is involved.
As early as 1873, in the leading case of Burnley v. Stevenson," 7 it was held that decrees for the conveyance of land, are
regarded as res judicata and if pleaded as a basis or cause of
action or defense in the courts of other states, they are entitled to the force and effect of record evidence of the equities
therein." 8
In 1916, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was faced squarely
with the issue of whether it should enforce that part of an
Illinois divorce and alimony decree which ordered the defendant to convey certain lands which he owned located in
Wisconsin. The Illinois court had both parties before it when
the decree was rendered, but the defendant had moved to
Wisconsin before it could be enforced. The court adopted the
general principle laid down in Burnley v. Stevenson with respect to recognition and enforcement in other states of decrees
for the transfer of foreign land. It was concluded that the
plaintiff was entitled to have the Illinois decree enforced by
a judgment of the Wisconsin court, and that the defendant
be ordered to convey the land to his former wife." 9
116. Accord, Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N. Y.

Supp. 851 (1916); Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 218 P. 756 (1923);
Sharp v. Sharp, 65 Okla. 76, 166 P. 175 (1916); MeRary v. McRary,

228 N. C. 719, 47 S. E. 2d 781 (1948).
117. 24 OHIo ST. 474 (1873).

118. Accord, Bunlap v. Ryers, 110 Mich. 109, 67 N. W. 1067 (1896);
Redwood Investment Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 P. 973 (1923)

holding that decrees for the transfer of foreign land create equitable

duties which will be recognized and enforced in other states, including
the states in which the land is situated.
119. Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182 (1916).
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In Matson v. Matson,20 a court of the state of Washington,
having both parties before it, granted a divorce and alimony
to a wife, and further ordered the husband to convey certain
land in Iowa to his wife. He failed to make such a conveyance and moved to Iowa where he transferred the land to a
grantee with notice. The former wife brought an action
against him in equity praying that the deed be set aside and
that the court require the former husband to convey the land
to her. The court followed the decision of Mallette v. Scheerer
and ordered the defendant to convey the land in compliance
with the Washington order. The court did not mention the
Mallette v. Scheerer case in its decision, nor did it expressly
decide this case contrary to Fall v. Eastin. The court attempted to distinguish the facts in this case from those in
the Fall case by pointing out that in the latter case, the husband of the plaintiff was not personally served with notice
and made no appearance in the suit ordering the conveyance,
while in the instant case the decreeing court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. However, it seems apparent that
the Matson case followed the Mallette case and was contra to
2
Fall v. Eastin.' '
It has been urged by some prominent writers in this field
that equitable enforcement of decrees ordering conveyance
of land in another state should be enforced by the courts in
the states where the land is situated. 22 As has been previously
pointed out, the refusal to grant relief in the Bullock case
seems to be based on two grounds: that the decree created no
binding obligation on the defendant but only a duty to the
court pronouncing the decree; that to recognize the foreign

equitable decree as a cause of action, would be to interfere
with the control which the state of the situs of the land exercises over real estate within its borders.
To this first argument, Judge Goodrich 123 points out that
this would apply equally to a decree ordering the payment of

120. 186 Iowa 607, 173 N. W. 127 (1919).
121. See also, Meents v. Comstock, 230 Iowa 63, 296 N. W. 721 (1941);

Williams v. Williams, 8 Or. 59, 162 P. 834 (1917).
122. E.g., BARBOUR, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE EQUITABLE
DECREE, 17 MICH. L. REV. 527 (1917), GOODRICH, ENFORCEMENT OF A
FOREIGN EQUITABLE DECREE, 5 IowA L. BuLL. 230 (1920).

123. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 218 (3rd ed. 1949).
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money, and it does not hold good in that instance. 124 Professor Barbour, in disclaiming a distinction between a decree
ordering the payment of money and doing any other act
states:
The decree assumes substantially the same form whether
it be for the payment of money or the conveyance of land;
it is formally but an order to the defendant to do an act,
which may be the payment of $1,000 or the execution of a
deed to Blackacre. Likewise, in the matter of enforcement, aside from statutory innovation, the method is the
same in both types of decrees. Any argument drawn
from the form of the decree or the means by which
it is
125
enforced applies equally to the decree for money.
Goodrich presents a counter-argument to the second contention made against the enforcement as set out in the Bullock case. As has been pointed out previously, a conveyance
of land in another state will be recognized as valid, where
made under compulsion of an order when the defendant is before the court. Judge Goodrich reasons that there is no real
distinction in regard to effecting land in another state where
this type of process is used in compelling a conveyance made
under an order of a court in a state where the land lies, based
126
on the decree of another state.
The contention that equitable enforcement of decrees ordering conveyance of land is situated in another state is supported
by the reasoning that the defendant has had full opportunity
to be heard in the original action; that there is no more interference with foreign land by the court rendering the decree than there is in any case where the conveyance made
124. Contra, POUND, PROGRESS OF THE LAW-EQurY, 1918-1919, 33
HAR. L. REV. 420, 424 (1920) ; Fall v. Eastin, supra, note 114-"Whether

the doctrine that a decree of a court rendered in consummation of equi-

ties, or the deed of a master under it, will not convey title, and that the
deed of a party coerced by the decree will have such effect is illogical or
inconsequent, we need not inquire nor consider whether the other view
would not more completely fulfill the Constitution of the United States
and that whatever may be done between the parties in one state may be
adjudged to be done by the courts of another, and that the decree might
be regarded to have the same legal effect as the act of the party which
was ordered to be done. The policy of a state would not be violated."
125. BARBOUR, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE EQUITABLE DECREE, supra, note 122. But see, POUND, PROGRESS OF THE LAW-EQUITY,
1918-1919, supra, note 124, in which it is asserted that the Mallette and
the Matson cases rest upon the false analogy of the enforcement of foreign judgments and of foreign decrees.
126. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 218 (3rd ed. 1949).
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under compulsion is recognized at the situs of the land as conveying good title; that it would be inequitable to refuse relief
to the plaintiff as to do so would allow the defendant to profit
by his own wrong and perhaps in effect deprive the plaintiff
127
of all effective relief.
Professor Barbour, in support of this view, asserts that
the decree creates a personal obligation upon the defendant
which a court of equity at the situs should enforce just as it
would a contract or trust concerning this land made in the
foreign jurisdiction. In further support of this view, Barbour contends that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution makes such enforcement of the foreign decree ob8
ligatory. 12
VI---SUMMARY,

SUGGESTED REMEDIES AND CONCLUSION

Summarizing, we find that an alimony decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction is a debt of record and entitled to
full faith and credit in a sister state, if it calls for a lump
sum payment. Where the decree calls for periodic payments,
it is enforceable as to sums due if the court issuing the original decree has not either by statute or the decree reserved
a clear power of modification. In any event, if the wife gets
the decreeing court to give a judgment for the sums due, such
judgment will be accorded full faith and credit in any other
state.
However, if the court which decrees payment of alimony
reserves the power to alter or revoke the accrued installments, full faith and credit need not be accorded such decrees by any other state under the present constitutional
interpretation as set out by the United States Supreme Court.
The majority of courts, have refused to go beyond the constitutional requirements of full faith and credit and will not enforce decrees which are subject to modification. Nor will these
courts extend the local equitable means of enforcement to
foreign alimony decrees and thus restrict the wife to an action
of debt. Under this view, even though the foreign decree meets
the requirements of full faith and credit as to accrued installments, the wife must bring an action each time a payment
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 139 (3rd ed. 1949).
128. BARFoUR, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE EQUITABLE DE-

127.

CREE, supra, note 122.
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falls due and it is impossible for her to have the decree enforced as to future installments.
Contrary to this view, we have seen that a growing number of states have granted relief to the wife in the enforcement of foreign alimony decrees, not because they are compelled to under the Constitution, but on grounds of comity
and public policy. Some courts which take this position, grant
equitable relief only to recover payments which have accrued at the time of the action, while others have established
the foreign decree as a judgment of its own court so as to
enforce the payments of future installments as well.
At the outset of this paper it was assumed that regardless
of any personal views as to the propriety of awarding alimony in general, once having been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, it should be enforced as any other legal
obligation. The courts which limit relief to the strict compliance with the full faith and credit requirements, are, in
effect, allowing the husband to evade his legal obligation by
leaving the state where the original decree was issued. This
result must be appalling to the sense of justice of any person whether or not he is versed in the law and would probably cause him to exclaim that "something should be donethat there is something wrong with a law that creates a right
but no method of enforcement."
This problem has become more acute in recent years due to
the increased mobility of our population. But still many of
the courts today cling to the limitations established by the
Sistare case and refuse to grant relief where the requirements set out therein are not met. It is submitted that the
states which grant relief to the wife on the grounds of public
policy and comity represent an enlightened view. Due to the
fact that this position has been taken by the courts which
have been faced with the enforcement of foreign alimony
decrees in increasing numbers in recent years, it seems to be
a safe assumption that this is the modern trend. From a standpoint of public policy, there can be little doubt that this is the
better view. The alimony payments represent the means of
providing the wife with the vital necessities of life, which if
not paid for by the husband, the proper source of her support,
she may become a ward of the state and thus compelled to
rely on the public to provide for her. The undeniable social
consequences of this result are obvious. Furthermore, allow-
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375

ance of relief to the wife is not contrary to any established
legal principles. The courts which deny equitable enforcement on the ground that alimony is a debt of record and enforcement only at law because the legal remedy is adequate,
seem to place an unrealistic interpretation on the real situation. This is evidenced by the fact that the remedy at law is
seldom invoked in an action to enforce a local order for alimony, but the usual method of enforcement is by some equitable process such as contempt proceedings against the recalcitrant husband. The only available remedy at law is execution
upon the property of the husband which often takes such a
long period of time to reduce the order to a judgment and then
execute on property that a wife may well have died of starvation long before she can recover any alimony payments if
she was compelled to rely solely on this method. Moreover,
there must be assets of the husband on which to execute, which
oftentimes have been concealed by the husband if such assets
ever did exist. And finally, to limit the wife to an action at
law, she could maintain the action only for payments which
had accrued at the time the suit is instituted, thus compelling
a multiplicity of suits, the expense of which would be prohibitive.
Another case in which the enforcement of an alimony decree has been frustrated, is one in which the husband is ordered to convey land lying in another state and he leaves the
jurisdiction of the issuing state before he can be compelled
to make the conveyance. It has been pointed out that such an
order need not be accorded full faith and credit in the state
where the land lies and the majority of states will not grant
relief to the wife in such a case.
There have been a few decisions to date which have refused to allow the husband to avoid his obligation to execute
the conveyance and have ordered him to comply with the foreign decree. This strongly suggests itself as the better view
from a social standpoint and is supported by the sound legal
reasoning of Judge Goodrich as set out in the earlier treatment of this problem.
It is encouraging to see an increasing number of states
following the lead taken by the Mississippi and California
courts in establishing a foreign alimony decree as a judgment
of their own courts. It is hoped that a greater number of
states will join in what appears to be the modern trend to-

Published by Scholar Commons, 1952

35

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1952], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

ward ordering a conveyance of land lying within its jurisdiction under a foreign decree. However, the numerical majority
of states probably still refuse to go beyond the constitutional
requirements of full faith and credit and thus deny relief to
the wife where she seeks equitable enforcement, recovery of
accrued installments which are subject to modification and
the enforcement of a decree ordering the conveyance of land
situated in another state under a foreign alimony decree.
A few possible methods whereby a wife may be allowed to
obtain relief in those states denying recovery, will now be
discussed. While it is recognized that none of these plans is
a panacea, they are suggested as tentative proposals.
(1) As the award and amount of alimony is based on the
needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay, it
seems proper that the decree should be modified when the circumstances of the parties change. If the state statute provides
that one of the parties may apply at any time for a modification of the decree, there is little reason why the payments
which have accrued under the decree need also be subject to
modification, as, for example, the Oregon statute set out previously, 129 a wife would have no difficulty in recovering such
accrued installments in,
a sister state. Such a statute would
enable the wife to obtain relief in a sister state for accrued
and unpaid installments, but would not solve the problem of
enforcing a foreign alimony decree in respect to future payments and an order to convey land lying in other than the
issuing state.
(2) A demand for federal legislation in this field has been
made, and while federal intervention in such matters may be
distasteful to the states, this may be the answer to granting
relief to the wife where the states have fallen short of protecting her right to have a foreign alimony decree enforced.
Such a statute would provide that every state must establish a foreign decree as a judgment of the state where enforcement is sought, so that all of the means of enforcing its
own decrees would be employed to enforce the foreign decree.
It is doubtful that this statute would be open to any serious
Constitutional obligations. It seems that such a statute would
be authorized under that part of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution which provides: ". .. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
129. See page 345 herein.
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acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
therof."130
(3) Another possible solution to this problem would be for
each state, either on a regional or a national scale, to enter
into a compact whereby each agrees to recognize and enforce
the decrees of any state which is a party to the agreement as
a judgment of their own courts. This would be similar to a
uniform act, and would be purely voluntary on the part of
each state. The practical difficulty of getting the states to
enter into such an agreement, however, is obvious and there
is little reason to expect the states which refuse to grant relief on grounds of comity to enter into such an agreement.
(4) Professor Bradway has suggested a possible solution
to the problem in the use of insurance, which has proved its
effectiveness in so many phases of business economic risks in
our present day society. 181 Just as many corporations and partnerships have so called "key man insurance" to compensate
them for any financial losses resulting from a loss of an important person in their organization, a marriage, which has
been likened to a partnership or corporation, would be protected against the economic difficulties resulting from its dissolution. Under this plan, a married couple could, on a voluntary basis, prepare in advance for the support of the wife in
the event of a subsequent broken marriage. The premiums for
such a policy, would be determined by actuary tables established after a reasonable period of experimentation. A body
of trained experts would investigate as to the social stability
of the family both for the purpose of calculating the risk and
for preventing fraud.
Thus, when the family breaks down, the wife has merely to
file her claim, and if it is approved, payments will be made
at once. If the claim is rejected, she would not be faced with
the difficult conflict of laws problem discussed in this paper
by the husband leaving the state, but would bring a usual
action in law against the insurance company to recover the
proceeds of the policy.
This plan, due in part to its novelty, will be open to suspicion as to its workability. There are also several very obvious
objections which may be raised. For example, how many
people entering into marriage or who are presently happily
130. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, § 1.
131. BRADWAY, WHY PAY ALIMONY, 32 ILL. L. Rsv.
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married, appreciate the extent of the risk of a broken home
sufficiently to warrant the amount of premiums they will be
compelled to pay. Furthermore, it may be argued that such a
policy would do more social harm than good and be against
public policy as an encouragement to married people to separate and collect the insurance.
(5) Several years ago, the committee on Uniform State
Laws of the National Conference appointed a special committee to investigate the situation and offer a proposed solution. This special committee drafted the "Uniform Support
of Dependents Act". The purpose of the act is stated in section
I as follows: "To secure support in civil proceedings for
dependent wives, children and poor relatives from persons
legally responsible for their support.' 132 Under this act a petition may be filed in the court in the county of the state wherein
the petitioner resides alleging that he or she is entitled to
support from a named party who is not a resident of or domiciled in or cannot be found in such state. A judge of such court
may then certify the petition and transmit it to the appropriate court in the state where the person liable for support is
located. The court in this latter state will then take jurisdiction of the person liable for support and order him to forward
the amount found to be proper, to his dependents.
This act provides for reciprocity with other states having
a substantially similar law so that both the state where the
dependent resides and the state where the person liable for
support is located must be subject to the act. In 1949 and
1950, the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky,
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Oklahoma passed this act. 33 In
1951, South Carolina enacted similar legislation, 34 so that
at the present time the Uniform Support of Dependents Act
applies to these 14 states.
It is conceded that all of the above suggestions are open to
many serious objections as to their application. The prime
purpose in setting them out, is to provide the reader with some
food for thought as to how the divorced or separated wife may
132.
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133. Note 132, supra.
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secure relief when her husband or ex-husband has left the
jurisdiction of the state granting her alimony.
If the advantages of these proposals are overcome by the
disadvantages, it is submitted that the United States Supreme
Court holds the key to the door which under the Sistare v.
Sistare and Fall v. Eastin cases, has many times been closed
on the wife "in her attempt to enforce an alimony decree when
the husband has crossed a state line. It may well be that the
solution to this problem may be compelled to wait until the
Supreme Court sees fit to remove the restrictions which these
cases have placed on the application of full faith and credit.
While the law which was set out in the above two cases has
not been disturbed, the fact that both were decided by a divided court may be a significant factor in the possibility of
reversal in the future. There is a very definite feeling by some
members of the Supreme Court that the holding in these cases
was not correct. Another important factor which should not
be overlooked in attempting to predict the treatment which
this court will give to this problem in the future, is the tendency to widen the scope of the full faith and credit clause.
It is therefore the view of this writer, that it is not unlikely that a majority of the courts will join Justice Jackson
in his position that finality of judgment is not the sine qua
non to the operation of full faith and credit. Furthermore, it
would not be surprising to find this so called "liberal" court
overruling the Fall v. Eastin case and holding that full faith
and credit applies to an order of a foreign court to convey
land situated in the state where enforcement is sought.
It is felt that this paper has served some purpose if it has
done nothing more than make the reader conscious of the inequities which have resulted from the present day interpretation of the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution in the field of enforcing foreign alimony decrees.
In conclusion, it seems indeed ironical that although the
states have gone to great lengths in creating equitable devices
to enforce local alimony decrees, while at the same time there
exists an anarchic "no mans land" between state boundaries
which provide a sanctuary for recalcitrant husbands who refuse to comply with a court order to provide for the support
of his divorced wife. State lines should not be a refuge for
those derelict in the fulfillment of their legal obligations.
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